Usurious interest is one of the most controversial legal concepts in the field of credit and financing in Spain. Its regulation stems from the historic 1908 Law for the Repression of Usury, known as the Azcárate Law, whose aim was to curb abuses in the granting of loans with disproportionate interest rates. Over more than a century, the interpretation of this law has evolved, especially in relation to revolving credit cards, which has generated a wealth of case law. Recently, Supreme Court Ruling 160/2025 of 22 January has further defined the concept of usury, consolidating criteria that merit detailed analysis.
The Law for the Repression of Usury, enacted on 23 July 1908, was promoted by Gumersindo de Azcárate, a professor and regenerationist politician, with the aim of protecting borrowers against abusive interest rates. Its article 1 establishes the nullity of loan contracts that set interest rates notably higher than the normal interest rate for money and manifestly disproportionate to the circumstances of the case, unless there are justified causes.
Since its entry into force, the interpretation of usury has evolved, especially in relation to consumer credit. For decades, the application of this rule was limited, as interest rates were regulated and financial transactions were not as diverse as they are today. However, with the liberalisation of the banking sector and the emergence of new financial products – particularly revolving credit cards – the issue of usurious interest has become very relevant in the courts.
Since the 21st century, the Supreme Court has consolidated a doctrine that establishes objective criteria to determine when an interest rate should be considered usurious. In particular, STS 628/2015, of 25 November, marked a milestone by declaring a revolving credit with an APR of 24.6% to be usurious, as it exceeded the average market rate in that category by more than six points. Since then, the criterion of comparison with the Bank of Spain’s data has become an essential benchmark.
More recently, STS 149/2020, of 4 March, reinforced this approach, stating that revolving credit has a specific category within consumer credit and must be compared with its average rate published in the Bank of Spain’s statistical bulletins. In this way, the concept of usury has been linked to a technical analysis based on the evolution of interest rates.
The prohibition of usury pursues a fundamental objective: to protect consumers and ensure balance in contractual credit relationships. Legislation and case law seek to prevent financial institutions from obtaining disproportionate profits by charging excessive interest, especially in situations of information asymmetry and borrower vulnerability.
One of the main problems with revolving credits is that they generate an over-indebtedness effect due to their repayment system. By applying very high interest rates and allowing the payment of small instalments, the outstanding capital is maintained for long periods, increasing the debt exponentially. This problem has been a key factor in the usury litigation in Spain.
The recent Supreme Court Ruling 160/2025, of 30 January, deals with a case in which a consumer sued for the nullity of a revolving credit card contract signed with Wizink Bank S.A.U., alleging that the APR of 27.24% was usurious. The ruling follows the jurisprudential line of previous cases, establishing the importance of the comparison with the data of the Bank of Spain.
The ratio decidendi of STS 160/2025 is based on the following principles:
- Comparison with the average market rate:
- The Supreme Court reaffirms that the interest rate must be compared with the average rate corresponding to the specific category of revolving credit, according to the data of the Bank of Spain.
- At the time the contract was signed (2015), the average revolving credit rate was 21.13% (TDER).
- Six-point difference as usury threshold:
- According to consolidated doctrine (STS 258/2023 and later), an interest rate is considered usurious if it exceeds the average rate applicable on the date of contracting by six points.
- In this case, the agreed interest rate (APR 27.24%) was not more than six percentage points higher than the TEDR corrected with commissions (approximately 21.5%), so it could not be qualified as usurious.
- The effect of commissions on benchmarking:
- The Chamber acknowledges that the TAE is higher than the TEDR because it incorporates fees, but holds that the usual difference between the two values does not substantially affect the usury analysis.
- It is stressed that the comparison should be made with the fee-adjusted TEDR to reflect the real cost of credit.
Given that the APR of 27.24% was not six points higher than the average market interest rate on the date of the contract, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of the Provincial Court of Cáceres, which rejected the nullity of the contract.
STS 160/2025 consolidates the Supreme Court’s doctrine on usurious interest in revolving credit, establishing a clear methodology for its analysis. The ruling underlines the importance of using objective criteria based on data from the Bank of Spain and establishes that only interest that exceeds the average rate of the corresponding category by six points will be considered usurious.